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THE JAINA THEORY OF MATTER.

[Our Readers have already read some of the very interesting and instructive articles of Mr. Harisatya Bhattacharyya, on Jaina philosophy such as the Jaina theory of Jiva, Space, Time, Dharma and Adharma which have appeared in the pages of the Gazette from time to time. His writings have always the characteristics of critical research and comparative study. In the following article he offers us an exposition of the Jaina theory of Matter. The theories of the Greek thinkers, of the ancient Indian philosophical systems and of the modern physicists regarding matter are examined side by side. The Jaina conception of the production of sound is different from that of the other Indian systems and is akin to the scientific theory; and the Jaina theory of Paramanu resembles the modern scientific conception of the Atom, as a geometrical centre of force. In the opening and the concluding paragraphs under the heading *Paramanu*, the author has tried to put some new interpretations to some Indian doctrines,—to some Jaina theories in particular. He has attempted to clear away some apparent riddles and inconsistencies in the accepted doctrines of the Jaina philosophy and in that, he has had to start new theories and offer his own explanation. We specially invite the attention of scholars to those paragraphs and request their valuable comments on the same. Ed. J. G.]

VARIOUS attempts have been from time to time made to connect philosophically Matter and Spirit which to Descartes seemed to be two independent realities. The early Greek materialists looked upon some form of Matter as the fundamental reality and all phenomena, as evolved from it. To a school of present day scientists also, Matter-stuff is the primal substance and consciousness, one of the products or bye-products of the brain. It seems that in ancient India too, there was a class of thinkers who were extreme materialists. These philosophers,—*Charvakas*, as they were called,—used to contend that the material elements were the ultimate realities and consciousness, only a bye-product of theirs. Idealism, on the contrary, tends to deprive Matter of much of its independence. To some of the extreme idealists, Matter is an illusion. To others e.g. the Hegelians, it is not an independent reality but a form or mode of the self-estrangement of the Absolute,—the *Other*, in and through which it realises itself. In India, we have the *Jnanadvaita-vada* of the Buddhist *Yogachara* school, according to which all phenomena of the world including Matter are essentially but idea; and we have also the school of *Ramanuja* who maintains that *Achit* or Matter is intended for and in-formed by the Spirit. The Jaina philosophy is opposed to materialism on the one hand and to idealism on the other. Like the Cartesians, the Jainas frankly maintain that Soul and Matter are equally real substances and that neither of them is derivable from the other. They call Matter, *Pudgala*. The word occurs in some places of the orthodox and the Buddhist writings as well; but there it means either Soul or Body. Pudgala has thus a peculiar sense in the Jaina metaphysics.

The early Greek philosophers were ever in search of a primordial substance which might be regarded as the basal Element of all the things of the world. Thales looked upon Water as the ultimate Element; Anaximenes declared it to be Air, Heraclitus regarded Fire as the primal substance of which all things were transformations; to Empedocles, Earth, Air, Fire and Water were the four "roots" of things. The

Bhutas (material Elements) of Indian philosophy are generally conceived to be akin to these primordial Elements of Greek thought. But this is most probably an erroneous view. For, while the Elements in Pre-Socratic philosophy were conceived as *living* substances, Matter in Indian thought was purely *material*. The early Greek philosophy was hylozoistic; while the Indian systems, so far as their conception of Matter was concerned, were rigidly materialistic.

Coming to the doctrine of the ultimate particles of material Elements we see that the '*Paramanu*' of the Indian philosophy is essentially different from the '*Atom*' of the Greek thought. Here also, the Indian theory seems to be nearer to the scientific conceptions of the present day than the Greek doctrine. To the Hellenic atomists, an Atom was an ultimate particle of substance, which could not be divided ('cut') any further. A gross material thing, is extended and the space, occupied by one such gross thing, cannot be occupied by another such thing while the former occupies it. The Greek atomists applied these characteristics of a gross material thing to the Atom also and held that the Atom, small as it is, is an extended substance, absolutely hard and impenetrable. The scientists of modern day have doubted whether we are justified in regarding Extension and Impenetrability as primary attributes of Matter and for the matter of that, of an Atom. When we come in contact with a material thing,—what we feel is simply that some force in us has met with a force outside us. Hardness and Extension, (i.e., filling space) are thus secondary attributes of Matter. Primarily, Matter and likewise, an Atom is a force. Accordingly, the modern physicists, e.g., Boscovitch, etc., have eliminated Extension and Impenetrability as primary attributes of Matter and are disposed to hold that an Atom is rather a point, endowed with inertia and certain powers of mutual attraction and repulsion. It may be doubted whether inertia and the powers of mutual attraction and repulsion are sufficient to explain the variedness in material phenomena and whether we should not suppose additional potentialities in Matter. But this

much is certain that according to scientific thought an ultimate material Atom is but a *point*, a seat of potentialities or forces, as modern science calls them.

In the *Sankhya* philosophy, the *Sthula Bhutas* or gross material elements are said to evolve from the *Tanmatras* or subtle elements. These Tanmatras are of *Rupa*, of *Rasa*, etc., etc. This clearly means that the Tanmatra or the subtle element is devoid of all the characteristics of a gross material thing. It is not conceived as a hard or impenetrable substance, filling space. It is rather a potentiality, becoming explicit in i.e., explaining Form (*Rupa*), Taste (*Rasa*) and so on. With reference to the characteristics of a gross thing, the subtle material elements of the Sankhya philosophers, far from being hard and space-filling Atoms, may be treated as almost immaterial. They are potentialities. This practically immaterial character of the Subtle Matter in the Sankhya philosophy is further apparent from the fact that the Tanmatras are said to have come out of *Ahamkara*,—not certainly a hard and impenetrable substance,—but an immaterial principle from which the senses are generated. At any rate, Matter in the Sankhya system, is only a potentiality and has not certainly Extension and Impenetrability as its primary attributes.

The '*Anu*' of the Nyaya philosophy also is not identical with the Atom of the Greeks. We are told that *Manas* or Mind is an Anu. (Vide Nyaya-Sutra 3-2-63). This doctrine seems to set aside all attempts to identify Anu with the impenetrable and space-filling Atom; for, Manas cannot be said to be a hard substance. As regards the nature of a material Anu, *Gotama* states significantly in aphorism 4-2-20—that there is no '*within*' or '*without*' in an 'Anu'. What can it be, then, but a geometrical point,—a metaphysical centre? An impenetrable and extended substance like an Atom,—however infinitesimally small it may be, must have an interior and exterior,—and if Anu has no '*Antar*' and '*Bahir*,' as Gotama contends, it is certainly different from the Atom of

the Greek thought. In the Nyaya system, Senses are said to be material in essence. This is perhaps another argument in support of our contention that so far as Gotama was concerned, he did not look upon Extension and Impenetrability as the primary attributes of Matter.

Coming to the Jaina conception of Pudgala, we find that it stands for Matter in both its gross and subtle states. In its subtle state, Pudgala no doubt exists in space; but it is more like a mathematical point than a hard and extended substance. The author of the *Panchasti-kaya-samaya sara* describes subtle Matter as "*Na:avakaso*" i.e., spatial and as "*Na Savakaso*," i.e, non-spatial. The contradiction which is apparent in such a description will disappear only if the *Pudgala-Paramanu* be conceived as a geometrical point, a seat of potentialities. That Matter in its extremely subtle state is not conceived primarily as an impenetrable, extended substance will also appear from the Jaina enumeration of the *Pradesas* in Pudgala. A Pradesa is that much of space which is occupied by one indivisible Paramanu of Matter. Now, Pudgala is said to have (i) numerable, (ii) innumerable and (iii) infinite Pradesas. The Pradesas, obstructed by the Paramanus, forming a particular compound thing can be counted while the Pradesas, occupied by all the Paramanus which exist in the *Lokakasa*, a limited space after all, are obviously innumerable. But how can Matter be said to have infinite Pradesas? The Jaina thinkers point out that the number of Pudgala-Paramanus in a subtle state may be said to be infinite and hence the Pradesas of Pudgala may be infinite. The author of the *Tattvartha-raja-vartika* distinctly says, "You cannot say that the Paramanus cannot be infinite in number as there is no infinite number of rooms for them in the universe. The Paramanus in their subtle state can interpenetrate or *in-form* one another." The subtle Paramanus, then,—any number of them—can occupy one and the same space simultaneously. This is possible,—it need scarcely be said—only if the subtle Pudgala be a geometrical point.

It thus appears that the Indian conception of Paramanu is essentially different from the Greek idea regarding an Atom. While the Greek Atom is but an infinitesimally small bit of Matter, impenetrable and extended—the Indian Paramanu like the modern scientist's Atom is primarily a geometrical point in space. Accordingly, the '*Ap*' of the Indian philosophers is not correctly understood, if it be identified with the Water of Thales. Water is a compound substance and the Greek philosopher was wrong in looking upon it as the primordial Element. We venture to think that the *Ap* of Indian philosophy is a force or potentiality which accounts for the *Rasa*, liquidness or taste of a thing. And so about the other *Bhutas* or *Dhatus*. All of them are like the mathematical centres or seats of potences, explaining the gross material phenomena which are the objects of our perception. They are neither gross matters, as we ordinarily suppose nor infinitesimally small bits of extended gross matters, as the early Greeks supposed the Atoms to be. In a sense, the Bhutas of Indian philosophy seem to be subtler than the Elements of modern science. The Elements produce material phenomena which are perceived by our senses. The Bhutas may be understood even to go beyond and permeate these Elements of modern science and explain the genesis of the material phenomena arising from them. The Bhutas are ultimate principles which *in-form* every Element of modern science. It is of course not denied that one Element is different from the other but all the Elements are similar in this respect that their products are variously perceptible by our senses. This similarly points to the Bhuta-potences underlying the Elements and regulating their products and phenomena.

At any rate, if, as many scientists suspect, many of what we call Elements may be but compounds which we have not succeeded in decomposing and if the Elemental Atoms accepted by modern chemistry may probably be molecules made up of still more ultimale atoms,—the Bhutas were meant and understood as something like such primordial

substrata by the early Indians. The Elements are the basal principles of the material phenomena which appeal to our senses and the Bhutas may be said to be the ultimate forces or potentialities, underlying the Elements themselves and *explaining their capability to be the basis of the sensible phenomena.* The fact that the Bhutas are actually supposed by some of the Indian philosophical systems to be the material basis of our Senses, shows also that the Bhutas were meant to be *the ultimate principles, explaining the sensibility of phenomena.*

The Charvaka thinkers in India contended that *Kshiti*, *Ap*, *Tejas* and *Marut*,—ordinarily translated as Earth, Water, Fire and Air,—were the four primordial Bhutas. Of these, *Kshiti* is the principle which explains Odour (*Gandha*) of things; *Ap* accounts for their Taste *(Rasa)*; *Tejas*, their Colour *(Rupa)*; and Marut, their Touch *(Sparsa)*. From this, some philosophers maintain that each of the Bhutas has only one quality; *Kshiti* has *Gandha*, *Ap* has *Rasa* and so on. Probably, the Sankhya philosophy would lend support to such a theory. The Naiyayikas, on the contrary while admitting that each of the Bhutas has a prominent quality characteristic of it,—assert that *Kshiti* has four qualities, Odour, Savour, Colour and Tangibility; *Ap* has three qualities viz , Savour, Colour and Tangibility; *Tejas* has two qualities viz., Colour and Tangibility; and *Marut* has only one quality viz., Tangibility (Vide 3-1-64, *Nyaya-sutras*). The *Vedanta* which, while proclaiming the nothingness of the world, admits its reality for practical purposes, maintains the essentially same theory.

According to the Jainas, "material substances are possessed of Tangibility, Taste, Odour and Colour" (Vide. *Tattvarthadhigama-Sutra V, 23*). In other words, with the Jainas also, the above four are the qualities of Måtter. But while the other Indian schools maintain that there are more than one Bhuta, all essentially different from one another, the Jainas contend that all Matter is but one substance, having the aforesaid four attributes. We may call Matter *Kshiti*, *Ap* etc., according to the prominence in it of one of those four qualities but we must not forget that all Matter,

whether it is *Kshiti* or *Ap* or *Tejas* or *Marut*, has all the four characteristics and as such, all Bhutas are but essentially one. One may think that in this Jaina theory of the one-ness of ultimate Matter, we have a foreshadowing of the conjecture of the present day scientists that the so-called elements may be but compounds of one or two ultimate simple substances.

The Bhutas and the Pudgala are thus ultimate material principles, explaining the phenomena which appeal to our sense-organs. But what about Sound? The *Naiyayikas* as well as the *Vedantins* agree that our auditory sensations are to be explained by the supposition of another Bhuta viz. *Akasa*. Akasa is ordinarily translated as Ether. It is said that the quality of Akasa is Sound. In 2-1-24 of the *Vaiseshika-Sutras*, *Kanada* says that Sound must be supposed to be the quality of Akasa, because of the argument that "every quality found in the effect must be referred to the quality in the cause." In other words, Sound is said to be possible because of the existence of Akasa, a material Bhuta. And just as *Kshiti*, *Ap*, *Tejas* and *Marut* are supposed to be the material constituent and basis of our sense-organs of Smell, Taste, Sight and Touch respectively. Akasa is the element of which our Sense of Hearing is made. Sound is thus a quality. The Naiyayikas contend that this attribute is to be found in Akasa and Akasa alone. The Vedantins, on the contrary, maintain that while it is the sole and distinctive quality of Akasa, it is nevertheless present in all the other four Bhutas.

The Jainas, however, deny that Sound is a quality. It is according to them, only a *modification* of Pudgala,—not one of its *qualities*. "Sound results from *Skandhas*," says *Kundakundacharyya*, "Skandhas are the aggregates of Paramanus. When these molecular masses or aggregates strike against one another, Sound is produced which may be *Natural* or *Artificial*." Sound, according to the Jainas then, is not an *attribute* of Pudgala-Paramanu like Taste, Smell, Touch and Colour; it is only a *mode* of the molecular mass, i.e., it is produced only when a gross substance strikes against another. If, then, Sound is not a quality, there need not be

any material element, viz., Akasa, having sound as its distinctive quality. Accordingly, the Jainas do not admit the reality of Akasa as a *material* substance.

It is to be noted, however, that although Akasa is no Pudgala or material Element according to the Jainas they admit the reality of Akasa as a non-psychical substance. It is characterised by the quality of giving space to all spatial things. "The attribute of Akasa," says the author of the *Tattvarthadhigama-Sutra*, "is to give room to all subtances.'. It is space which is one pervading substance. It seems that the *Vedanta*, although it attributes Sound to Akasa,—is inclined to admit the Jaina theory of Akasa. In the fifty-fourth stanza of the Second Chapter of *Panchadasi*, its author distinctly says, "Akasa is the first modification of *Maya* and is characterised by *Avakasa*." Avakasa is emptiness in which things are contained or rather, which makes the spatial existence of things possible. The philosophers of the Sankhya school also maintain that the characteristic of Akasa is that things are contained in it. In 2-1-20 of the *Vaiseshika-sutras*, Kanada criticises this Sankhya doctrine; but he admits that Akasa, although it is a material Element, having sound as its attribute, is not atomic. It is according to him also, one and an all-pervasive substance. One man is happy but another is unhappy at the very same moment ; this leads us to admit the multiplicity of souls ; but in the case of Akasa, we have the quality of sound in every part of it ; this is how Kanada establishes the one-ness of Akasa.

Pudgala is thus Matter of which things having forms or shapes are made. According to the Jainas, the bodies, speech, mind, acts of inhalation and exhalation,—all these are due to Pudgala, being attached to the *Jiva*. It is Matter sticking to a soul which accounts for the latter's births and re-births in the *Samsara*. It follows that pleasures and pains, experienced by a soul in the world, its very life and death here are all due to its attachment to Pudgala which is so foreign to its essence.

Gunas of Pudgala.

The Jaina philosophers consider a substance from two view-points viz., of its Qualities and of its Modes. It has already been observed that according to the Jainas, Matter is characterised by four primary attributes,—touch, taste, smell and colour. Of these touch is said to be of eight kinds,—soft (*Mridu*), hard (*Kathina*), heavy (*Guru*), light (*Laghu*), cold (*Sita*), hot (*Ushna*), smooth (*Snigdha*) and rough (*Ruksha*). Taste is of five varieties,—pungent (*Tikta*), sour (*Katuka*), acid (*Amla*), sweet (*Madhura*) and astringent (*Kashaya*). Two kinds of smells are recognised,—fragrant (*Surabhi*) and bad (*Asurabhi*). Hues are said to be of five kinds ; they are blue (*Nila*), yellow (*Pita*), white (*Sukla*), black (*Krishna*) and red (*Lohita*). Without entering into finer details, we may say that the thinkers of the other schools of Indian philosophy also,—nay, the philosophers of the ancient schools as a rule—admitted that the attributes of colour, taste, smell and touch inhere in Matter. This doctrine seems to have been a very ancient one and a common conception among the philosophers of old.

But what about Sound ? The thinkers of the Nyaya and the Vaiseshika schools maintained, as we have already noticed, that sound is a quality, inherent in an invisible, all-pervading substance, Akasa. " Every sound," says the author of the *Bhasha-Parichchheda*, " inheres in Akasa ; it is perceived by us when it is produced in our ears. According to some, it is produced like a succession of waves while others contend that the phenomenon resembles the *Kadamba*-bud." The meaning is that a violent contact or separation of hard substances effects a contact or separation in Akasa, pervading those substances. The vibration thus caused in the Akasa in which sound as a quality is inherent makes sound explicit which coming in contact with the Akasa in the hearer's ears, makes itself heard. In sum, the Nyaya and the Vaiseshika theory is that 1. Sound, as we hear it, is carried to our ears as a vibration or an on-coming wave. 2. This vibration is *of* a rather *in* an all-pervading substance, called Akasa, of which sound is a quality.

With the orthodox *Mimansakas*, the *Vedas* were the absolutely infallible authority. The Vedas however, consist in sound; hence, if sound were nothing more than an attribute of a substance, it seems that the Vedas cannot be looked upon as the eternal and the immutable authority. Accordingly, the thinkers of the *Mimansa* school enunciated the curious doctrine that Sound-in-itself or the Noumenal sound is a real substance. They contended that underlying the varied phenomenal sounds (*Dhvanis*, as they called them), there is the eternal and the unchangeable Noumenal sound (the *Sphota*), which is a substance.

Roughly speaking, according to the Nyaya and the Vaiseshika schools, sound is a quality while according to the Mimansakas, it is a substance. The Jaina theory of sound seems to be a mean between the two. The Jainas do not recognise Akasa as a material substance; nor, do they look upon sound as a quality of Matter. They admit that sound, as we hear it, is carried to our ears as a vibration or an on-coming wave; but on this account, it need not be an attribute of a substance, Akasa. *Sound is a mode of Matter; it is Matter itself, modified in a certain way.* Sound is heard when that peculiarly modified Matter,—Matter in vibration—is carried to our ears.

But although the Jainas reject the Nyaya doctrine of Sound and seem to agree with the Mimansakas to some extent, they differ from the latter on very important points. First of all, the Jainas maintain that all sounds are non-eternal temporary phenomena; on this point, they agree with the Naiyayikas and differ from the Mimansa philosophers, according to whom, there is a Noumenal sound which is eternal and unchanged. Secondly, although the Jainas admit that sound is substantial, their doctrine is that it is not Matter as it is in itself; it is only a *mode* of Pudgala, a peculiar modification of it,—a passing phase.

Paryayas of Pudgala.

Coming to the consideration of Matter in its modifications,—i.e., the aspect of its *Paryayas*, we find the author of the

Dravya Samgraha stating, "Modifications of Matter are Sound, combination, Minute, Gross, Shape, Separation, Darkness, Shadow, Brilliance and Heat." Of these, the nature of sound has already been briefly described and will be dealt with a little later on. With regard to these modifications of Pudgala, the author of the *Panchasti-kaya* speaks of its four possible states or conditions viz., *Skandha*, *Skandha-pradesa*, *Skandha-desa* and *Paramanu*. The first is Matter in its gross form,—*material body*, having all the physical qualities without exception while the last is the *primary atom*. *Skandha-desa* is described as the half of *Skandha* and *Skandha-pradesa*, the half of *Skandha-desa*. Thus while *Skandha* is a complete molecular constitution, *Skandha-desa* and *Skandha-pradesa* are incomplete masses, although both of them are aggregates of *Paramanus*. Of the four modes of Matter, just described, *Skandha* and *Paramanu* are the most important, for they exhibit Matter in two of its extreme forms.

Paramanu

The essential nature of the ultimate Matter-stuff has already been touched upon. The Paramanu is eternal, in as much as it was never created by any Being and as it will never be destroyed. Sound, it will be noted hereafter, is a modification of Matter according to the Jainas and as such does not belong to the ultimate atom. The Paramanu is accordingly described as '*Asabda*' i.e., silent or unsounding. There can be no Matter-stuff finer than the Paramanu, which is thus the limit of all molecules and gross material substances. All things having forms are the aggregates of Paramanus and so logically at least, the Paramanu must be conceived as of corporal form. Earth, Water, Air and Fire were looked upon as the primal material Elements by some of the early Greek thinkers. The author of the *Panchasti-kaya-Samayasara* distinctly says that the Paramanu is subtler than these Elements, in as much as it is "*Dhaduchaduktassa Karanam*" i.e., the cause of these four Elements. The Paramanu is *spatial* as it is undoubtedly a point in space; but this does not mean that it is a minute, hard, impenetrable substance like the

Atom of Democritus. The Jaina philosophers call the Paramanu *non-spatial* also, so that their theory resembles the modern scientific conception of the Atom, as a geometrical centre of force.

According to the Jainas, it is the Paramanu which by its motion from one space-point to the immediate next, determines the minutest instant of time; in other words, an instant or the shortest point or period of *Kala* corresponds to the motion of a Paramanu from the spatial point occupied by it to the immediate next. A Paramanu is thus the *measure of time.* The quantity or density (*dravya*) of a material mass as well as the extent of space (*Kshetra*), occupied by it, depend obviously on the Paramanus, the constitutive elements of the mass. The temporal order (*Kala*) of the mass is also dependent on the Paramanus. And finally, the Paramanus, through their aggregation and disintegration, determine the varied modifications (*bhava*) of a material substance. For these reasons, a Paramanu is looked upon as the "*Pavihatta*" of "*Samkha*" i.e., determinate of the number or quantity of a material mass.

The constitutive Paramanus thus are what differentiate one Skandha from another. They by their combination or disintegration make or unmake the Skandhas. It is doubtful if the mystery with regard to the actual mode of the Paramanus combining with one another has been satisfactorily solved. What so far the scientists have been able to determine is that a peculiar combination of elemental atoms yields a peculiar effect; but the question *how* the atoms do actually combine, remains unanswered still. We need not enter into details here of the Jaina account of the combinatiun of the Paramanus. According to *Uma-svami*, the atoms of Matter unite because of their attributes which he calls 'Snigdhatva' or smoothness and '*Rukshatva*' or roughness. He says that an atom with the minimum degree of smoothness or roughness cannot combine with another; that atoms with equal degree of smoothness or roughness of the same state cannot combine with an atom of their own or of the opposite state; that

in order that an atom may unite with another, there should be a difference of two degrees of smoothness or roughness between them. It is difficult indeed to correctly understand the implications of these doctrines of the author of the *Tattvartha-sutram.* One thing, however, is certain,—that he did not intend the terms, *Snigdha* and *Ruksha* to be taken in their literal sense. We have tried to show how the Paramanu or the ultimate stuff of matter was conceived by the Indian philosophers, not as hard and impenetrable material particles,—but rather as mathematical centres, almost immaterial, so to say. The attributes, Smoothness and Roughness, as ordinarily, understood, can belong only to a material mass or massive matter; they cannot apparently mean anything, when applied to *non-spatial space-points*, as the Paramanus are. We are accordingly tempted to think that the attributes; 'Smoothness' and 'Roughness', when applied to the ultimate atoms, can only mean a peculiar *capacity* and a *responsive reciprocity* in them to combine with one another.

There is another point regarding the Paramanu which we want to notice very briefly before we finish our consideration of the nature of an Atom. Pudgala has been described by the Jainas as characterised by touch, taste, smell and colour. The Paramanu, as the ultimate stuff of Pudgala must accordingly be thought of as a potentiality which makes those sensuous phenomena explicit in the Skandha or material mass. Now, touch has been said to be of eight kinds, taste, of five, smell, of two and colour, of five varieties. The Jaina philosophers, however maintain that an Atom has a single taste, colour and smell and two contacts. Are we then to suppose that Atoms are of different kinds, rather of different stuffs,—so that some are red-colour-atoms, some blue-colour-atoms, some yellow-colour-atoms, some cold-touch-atoms, some rough-touch-atoms, some acid-taste atoms, some sweet-taste-atoms, some fragrant-smell-atoms, some loathsome-smell-atoms and so on? We think, the fundamental doctrine of the Paramanu, as enunciated by the Jainas would not permit the recognition of any such *qualitative* differences in the Atoms. Atoms in themselves, are all strictly similar to each other, not only *quanti-*

tatively but also *qualitatively*. This means that all the varieties of touch [except the touches of heaviness, lightness, softness and hardness which are to be found exclusively in compounds and obviously not in the primary atoms], two kinds of smell, five modes of taste and five kinds of colour are implicit in each and every Atom. Every atom is capable of producing any colour, any taste, any smell and any touch. What, then, is meant when the Paramanu is said to be of only one single taste, colour etc? We think, here the nature of the Paramanu is considered with reference to its corresponding gross material mass. A Skandha or a moleculer mass, as every one knows, can have only one taste; it cannot have all the five tastes at one and the same time. So, as regards smell, it is either agreeable or disagreeable,—it cannot be both. Similarly, with regard to colour, it is either red or yellow etc. and cannot be of more than one colour at one and the same time. And lastly, as regards touch, a material gross thing can have two i.e., a pair of compatible touches at one time e.g. heat and roughness' cold and smoothness,—and not all the eight forms at once. It seems that when the Atom is said to be of one taste etc. etc. all that is meant is that so far and so long you consider the characteristics of a particular Skandha, you must attribute the same qualities to its constituent Atoms. Thereby, however, the capacity of an atom to develop different characteristics in different Skandhas is by no means denied. When we have a particular Skandha manifesting particular characteristics, we are to attribute only those particular characteristics to its constituent Paramanus; this does not mean that those Paramanus can on no account evolve different characteristics. While commenting on the doctrine that a Paramanu has a single taste, colour, etc. etc. Professor Chakravarti says, "This description would naturally introduce qualitative difference among atoms and yet according to the author, there can be no qualitative difference among atoms as they are identical material units." He stops abruptly, creating an impression that we are here face to face with a contradiction in the Jaina theony,—a riddle which it is impossible to explain. The

contradiction, it seems to us would disappear if we remember that an Atom is said to be of one colour, one taste, etc., only in reference to the gross thing, of which it is a constituent part. A Paramanu in itself, is a potentiality for any of the sense-phenomena. Thus, in the technical terms of the Jaina epistemology, we may say that from the view-point of their *Dravya* or essential substance, all the atoms are similar and there is no qualitative difference among them but that from the view-point of their *Paryaya* or modifications in gross material things, an Atom has only one single taste, smell etc. so that there is to be admitted a qualitative difference among the Atoms.

While expounding the above view of ours, we are not unmindful of what *Akalanka* states in this connection. "The Paramanu," he says, "is to be known as of one taste, one smell, Why? Because it has no varied parts." He argues that while a peacock, as a gross thing may have different colours, you cannot attribute more than one colour to the Atom. Closely viewed, the theory of Akalanka does not go against what we have stated. When he says that a peacock has varied colours, all that he means is that the different parts of a peacock's body have different colours. We agree with Akalanka in admitting that a particular colour,—and no other colour—is to be attributed to those Atoms which constitute that part of the peacock's body which bears that particular colour. But this does not mean that these atoms are eternally of that particular colour only and that they are never capable of producing any other colour. Akalanka must have meant that when those atoms combined to make that particular part of the peacock's body, they developed only that one single colour,—the capacity for producing other colours being allowed to remain dormant rather in abeyance, in them, for the time being.

[To be continued.]

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HOUSEHOLDER'S DHARMA IN JAINISM.

(By Kamta Prasad Jain M.R.A.S.)

JAINISM occupies an important place among the ancient religions of India. Its philosophical tenets, ethical rules and theories of logic have a peculiar aspect of their own, which speaks itself for its antiquity and universality. Jainism maintains that all the living beings, whether a human being or a smallest insect, have a common source; i.e. the *Nitya Nigoda*.[1] And so they are but brethren—however unmanifested the real faculties of any of them may be in their present incarnations; for, the souls are under bondage of matter, which has crippled their own nature. Obviously it is evident that Jainism is based on a dualistic system of philosophy. It holds that Soul (Jiva) and non-soul (Ajiva), i.e., matter are the main factors and causes for all the manifestations of this universe. In its true nature, soul is an all-seeing, all-knowing and all blissful being. But as it is in combination with matter from eternity, it transmigrates into various forms of life and undergoes all kinds of sufferings pertaining to them. The characteristics of its real nature, too are not fully manifest in this embodied condition. Hence the great aim and object for the embodied soul is to get itself separated from the combination of matter and this is only possible by following the rules of conduct, as chalked out by the great *Tirthankaras*, with right belief and right knowledge.[2]

1. Nigoda is that place is which filled with infinite number of the Nigoda Jivas. The Nigoda Jivas, in the Jaina theory, is that form of life, which is lower and more miserable than even that of single-sensed beings. Here even the sense of touch is not manifest, and the souls inhabit, a part of another's body. Their life-span is very short; they are said to undergo eighteen births and deaths in one *Svasa* or breath. These Nigoda Jivas furnish the supply of souls in place of those, which reach Nirvana. See Panchastikaya-sara etc.

2. Tattwartha Sutram. 1.

The foremost among these *Tirthankaras* of this cycle of time, for, there ever have been and will be in future a set of 24 Tirthankaras at all times, is Lord *Rishabha*. He was the first Preacher of Jainism in the *Karmabhumi*[3] during this Kalpa. The literary evidence from the Hindu[4] and Buddhist[5] sources, too, is available in this respect, which establishes the great antiquity of this religion of India beyond doubt.

But, however, we do not intend to give a detailed account of its history and beliefs here. Our aim is simply to give a right expression of its ethical code for a householder, which may, also, dispel a few misapprehensions prevailing in certain quarters in regard to it.

Nevertheless at the very outset, we should not overlook the fact that as a universal religion, Jainism has been a proselytising faith from the very early times. The Aryans and non-Aryans were equally received in its fold. It is evident from the fact that there were not observed any distinctions of caste and creed in the preaching hall (*Samosarana*) of the *Tirthankara* and His sermons were always addressed to all living beings alike—whether human or non-human and whether Aryans or non-Aryans. Almost all the Jaina *sastras* bear testimony to this universality of Jainism. In the introductions to the sermons of *Jinas*, as preserved in the *Agama Sutras* of the *Swetambara* sect, it is always pointed out that they are addressed to Aryans and non-Aryans. We find a mention of the conversion of a potterman by name *Saddalputta* of *Polaspur by Bhagawan Mahavira* in the Swetambara *Uvasagadasao Sutta* (Hect. 6). The great Digambara Acharya Sri Samantabhadraji says that a *matanga* (Chandala), endowed with the faith in Jainism (Samyagdarsana) is worthy of worship by the

3. "Karmabhumi is the place where agriculture, etc. are followed by men for their subsistence."—See Jaina Gem Dictionary.

4. Bhagavata 5. 3-4 ; Vishnupurana, etc.

5. Satasastra quoted in the "Vira"-Vol. IV, p. 353

1. The Indian Sect of the Jainas, p. 3 f. n.

Devas of heaven.[2] This reference from the Digambara Jaina Sastra, supported by the following few more examples establishes the universality and proselytising spirit of Jainism beyond question. Sri Jinasenacharya mentions in his "*Harivansapurana*," the very presence of the *Matanga Vidyadharas* in the Jaina temple, who came there to worship the great *Jinas*.[3] Muni Kankamara writes in his "*Karakanducharita*" that a certain Vidyadhara was obliged to pursue a livelihood of the *Chandala* in the cemetery of Dantapur and queen *Padmavati* left her new-born baby with him, who grew up under his protection and professing Jainism, he became a renowned king of Kalinga and Champa. Afterwards he renounced the world, followed the life of a Jaina Muni and attained to *Sarvartha Siddhi* heaven.[4]

Besides these and many other scriptural references, there can be gathered historical instances as well, which shall, also, support our problem. The early Greek writers have mentioned the Gymnosophists, as a class of the Indian sophists, who were no other than the *Niganthas* or the Jainas.[1] "Prophyrius mentions two orders of them; one the *Brachmens* the other the *Samanoeans*: the *Brachmens* receive religious knowledge, like the priesthood, in right of birth; but the *Samanoeans* are select and consist of persons choosing to prosecute divine studies.' He adds on the authority of Bardesanes that...' the *Samanoeans* are not of their (Brahmin) race; being selected from the whole nation of Indians."[2] This passage asserts clearly that the doors of the *Sramana Dharma* (Religion of Mahavira) [3] were open to all peoples and so, we find Jainism

2. "Samyagdarsana Sampannamapi matanga deham.
Devadevam vidurbhasma gudangaratma raujasam. Ratnakarandakam."
3. "Sastrikah khecra yatah Siddhakutajinalayam,
Ekadavanditam sopi Sourir Madanvegaya 2."
Ami Vidyadharahyaryah samasena samiritah, Matanganamapi Svaminnikayan rnu vacmite 14."
4. Karakandu Carita, Sandhi, 3.
1. Encyclo. Britainica. Vol. XV p. 128 (11th ed.)
2. Asiatick Researches, Vol. IX, p. 298—299.
3. Kalpasutra p. 83.

preached in the foreign countries ; such as Arabia [4] Abyssinia, Greece etc.[5] Even the mention of the conversion to Jainism of such aboriginal inhabitants of India, as Bhars and Kurumbas, is also, traceable. Most of the famous kings of Hindu India, as Chandragupta Maurya, Amoghavarsa, Kumarpal etc., were all converts to Jainism. There are accounts of the conversion of Akbar, the Great also.[6] In the Digambara sect of the Jainas, a Muhammadan convert to Jainism, by name Jinabakhsa, commands a great respect. His lyrical compositions are recited even, by the orthodox Jainas.

Sri Jinasenacharya expresses openly the proselytising creed of Jainism in his famous work the "*Mahapurana*" and gives the ritual rules under which a non-Jaina could be converted to Jainism.[7] Thus the universality of Jainism is quite clear. Its doors were open, even very recently, for the peoples of all classes and colors.[8] Even to-day this main feature of Jainism has not totally dwindled in the overwhelming and false social customs. Only recently the Jains showed a shrewed sense of religious thought, in welcoming a distinguished German lady to their faith. The late Mr. V. R. Gandhi, late Justice Rai Bahadur J. L. Jaini and Jaina-Darsana-Divakara Mr. Champat Rai Jain, Vidyavaridhi carried and diffused the light of the universal teachings of Lord Mahavira in the western countries during this century. And I am glad to note that this ancient spirit of Jainism is now appealing to the hearts of almost all the Jains in a commanding manner and a few other examples of conversions to Jainism has followed since then.

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4. Asiatick Researches, Vol. IX. p. 284.

5. Lord Mahavira and other Teachers of His Time, p. 19. The Original Inhabitants of Bharatvarsha, pp 41 and 246.

6. Ind. Anti. XI, 256.

7. Mahapurana, Parva 39.

8. This is supported by the evidence of Dr. Buhler, who writes about Jainism on his experience and witness, that the " conversions of people of low caste such as gardeners, dyers, etc. are not uncommon even at the present day. Muhammadans too, regarded as *Mlechchas*, are still received among the Jaina communities. Some cases of the kind were communicated to me in Ahmedabad in the year 1876, as great triumphs of the Jains. etc."—Indian Sect. of the Jains. p. 3. f. , n

The very proselytsing spirit of Jainism, has caused a distinguishing division in its primary course of ethics. The belief in one's aim and object is the very essential thing to make progress in that respect. Consequently the Jaina authors too, have given great stress on the right belief of a soul, which consists ordinarily, in believing the *D-va, Sastra* and *Guru* and, the *Tattwas* as well, as described in Jainism. The Jaina Acvearyas hah expressed it, as the very root of the *Dharma.* (Darsana mulo dhammo). And so, rightly it is said that the devotees wanting in faith are not entitled to attain to the final beatitude, because they have really transgressed the right path and have lost faith in that. This hinders them from entering into the happy land of bliss[1]. But, on the other hand, those beings, who have although swerved from rightly observing the ethical rules of the right path, possess the right faith intact, will surely get liberated soon. This fact has made the ethical course twofold: viz; (1) *Samyaktwacarana Charitra*, (Conduct pertaining to the Right Belief; i.e having pure and correct Right Belief), and (2) *Samyamacarana Charitra*, (Conduct concerning the Right Behaviour)[3]. Without the full observance of the first kind, no one can succeed in progressing to the second one; and of course, along with the Right Faith and Right Conduct, the Right Knowledge is also, an essential link. Hence although the Right Faith, Right Knowledge and Right conduct constitute the Right Path for the final emancipation, the Right Faith occupies a prominent place in it. It alone, is also, counted as the Royal Road to Moksha.[4] This has made the missionary aspect of the religion of the *Tirthankaras* more easily practicable.

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1. "Sammattarayanabhattha jananta vahuvihain satthain/ Arahanavirahiya bhamanti tattheva tattheva |4|"—St. Kundakunda.

2. "Dansanabhatta bhattha dansana bhattassa natthi nivvanam | Sijjhanti cariyabhatta dansanabhatta na si jhanti | 3 | "

3. "Jinanaditthisuddham padhamam sammattacaranacarittam | Vidiyam sanjamcaranam jinanasadesiyam tam pi | 5"

4. "Jaha mulao khandho sahaparivara bahugun hoi | Taha Jinadansana mulo niddittho mokkhamaggassa | 11"

Nevertheless we should, also, remember that there are two forms of the Samyamácarana *Dharma* (Law) in Jainism.[5] The first and foremost of these two, is intended for those Jain recluses, whose aim is to acquire the final liberation from the bondage of world, if possible, in this very life. And the other form is for the householders, who practise the rules of the former in a partial manner. Consequently they are not entitled to get the final liberation in their present condition; though their continuous practice of this form makes them more and more qualified for the same.

Jiva-Samasa : Classes of Souls.

JAINISM teaches that there are infinite numberof souls in the Universe. They are eternal and were never created. In the first place they are divided into two classes, Liberated Souls (Mukta-jivas) and Unliberated Souls (Samsari-jivas). There is no difference or class among the Liberated Souls. The Unliberated souls are divided into Sthavara Jivas and Trasa Jivas. Those which have the capacity to move from one place to another are called trasa Jivas and those which cannot move so are named sthavara jivas. According to the bodies which they inhabit, the sthavara Jivas are said to be either gross (Badara) or subtle (sukshma). The sthavara jivas have only one sense, i.e. the sense of touch. A Badara jiva is one which has a body which can be perceived by us; whereas a Sukshma jiva has a subtle body quite imperceptible to us. It is said that sukshma jivas of this type are every where in the Universe.

Trasa Jivas (mobile souls) are classified into those having two-senses, three senses, four senses, and those having five senses.

Two-sensed beings like worms, oysters, conches etc. have the senses of taste and touch.

5. "Duviham sanjamcaranam sayaram tah have nirayaram |
Sayaram sagganthe pariggaha rahiya khalu nirayaram | 21"

Three sensed beings like ants, bugs, bee etc. possess the senses of touch, taste and smell.

Four-sensed beings like flies, bees, mosquitoes have the senses of touch, taste, smell and sight.

Five-sensed beings like men, birds, beasts, gods etc. possess the senses of touch, taste, smell, sight and hearing.

Jivas of five senses are divided into two classes, those having mind and those having no mind.

As things like rooms, jars, cloth may be complete or incomplete, so Jivas should be understood to be complete or incomplete (Paryapta and Aparyapta).

Ahara (taking food and drink), *Sarira* (Body), *Indriya* (senses), *Anaprana* (respiration) *Bhasa* (Speech), and *Manas* (Mind) these six make Jivas complete. Of these the first four make Jivas having one sense complete, and the first five make Jivas having two, three and four senses complete. As for Jivas having five senses, all the six are necessary to make them complete (Paryapta). In the absence of these the Jivas are said to be incomplete (Aparyapta).

Thus we have fourteen classes of Jivas Paryapta and Aparyapta of the 7 classes.

1. Gross immobile beings } one sensed
2. Subtle immobile beings } one sensed
3. Two sensed beings.
4. Three sensed beings
5. Four sensed beings
6. Five sensed beings with mind
7. Five sensed beings without mind.

NOTES AND NEWS.

Election to the Council of State.

We offer our hearty congratulations to Babu Nirmal Kumar Jain, Zamindar and Banker of Arrah, on his election as a member to the Council of State by the Bihar and Orissa constituency. Babu Nirmal Kumarji comes of a very rich

and respectable family in Arrah. He is the illustrious son of the late Devkumarji the famous benefactor of the Jain Community. Like his noble father, he is also imbued with devotion to the Jain Literature and love for the Jain Community. His amiable appearance, his gentle manners and his liberal mind will easily win for him the respect and confidence of those with whom he may come in contact. He is the first Jain to be elected as a member to the Council of State. We wish him a successful career as a member in the highest Legislative Body of the country.

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A Donation.

We beg to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of Rs. 200 (Rupees Two hundred only) sent by Mr. J. L. Mithal, M.A.,LL.B., Indore, as a contribution to the Gazette from the Fund of the late J. L. Jaini. Our special thanks are due to the Trustees of Jaini's Estate for their kindness in sanctioning this contribution.

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Lesson for the Jains.

A Christian Journal records with just pride that there are in India 141 Orphanages, 170 Industrial Schools, 617 High Schools, 15,820 Secondary Schools, 98 Agricultural Schools 50 Colleges, 94 Training Schools, 408 Dispensaries, 99 Journals, 1698 Doctors and Nurses, 48,044 Teachers, 7,82,924 Missionaries and 700 Missionary Homes purely maintained by Christian Mission Funds. Every year Rs. 5,84,173,000 are spent for the above items. And this amount, which is spent in India, is paid by the Christian countries including America.

The Jain Community is said to be a very rich community and Jainism is held to teach universal love and brotherhood. Now we ask our brethren. How many institutions of the above type have they to their credit? The progress of other communities in all walks of life is like an eye-opener to the Jains. If they do not take lesson now and care for themselves, they will be completely lost before long. Jainism is already on the verge of its grave. If the Jains will not care to save it, then who else will?